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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
HORACE F. TAYLOR, doing
business as
TAYLOR MOTOR SERVICE
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
KENNETH B. MURRAY,
Defendant and Appellant.
vs.
CHARLES P. STUART,
Third-Party Defendant
and Respondent.

CIVIL CASE
NO. 7570

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
The respondents do not agree with appellant's brief,
and desire to controvert the same and state wherein said
brief is inconsistent with the facts.
1. There was never a completed contract between
Stuart and Murray; nor was there ever a meeting
of the minds thereon.
2. Murray never took the Stuart certificate of title
to the Hudson for Stuart to complete prior to
November 9th, nor while in the employ of Taylor.
Nor did he ever take the certificate to Stuart for
the purpose of completing the same for his own
behalf. On the contrary he obtained Stuart's
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signature thereon as an agent of Taylor, at Taylor's request and for the purpose of returning the
same to Taylor.
4. Taylor did not interfere with dealings between
~1urray and Stuart; nor did he cause a breach of
contract between them; and in fact there never
was such a contract. Any default by Murray to
Lockhart Finance Co. was caused by Murray's
own misconduct and failure.
5. Murray knew of the demands of the Finance
Company, and voluntarily placed the Packard in
storage, and failed and refused and neglected to
bring the delinquencies up to date. Taylor did
not retain the proceeds of re-sale, but applied
them on the amount he had repaid to the Finance
Company upon Murray's default.
6. Neither Taylor or Stuart admit by pleadings or
otherwise that there was ever a contract between
Murray and Stuart.
7. There is no stipulation between counsel that the
only question was fraud, nor that the verdict of
the jury would control the liability of the parties.
Nor did the Court disregard the verdict of the
jury.
8. Conclusions to be drawn from appellant's statement of facts lead to error, and the statement
when considered as a whole is inconsistent with
the facts.

1/u

STATEMENT OF FACTS
(For convenience, the parties are referred to by their
surnames.) When Murray went to the beet field to make
a deal with Stuart, he had previously been trying to sell
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a new Packard, '50 model to Stuart ( Tr. 57). As a matter
of fact Muray said to Stuart: "I said to Mr. Stuart that
this car was a 1950 Packard," and he further told Stuart
that although it was registered with the State of Utah as
a 1949, that the same could be changed to a 1950, through
a "little red tape." (Tr. 85.) No such change of registration could have been n1ade once it was registered. (Tr.
152-3-4). There is good reason why stuart wanted a '50
model, for it is common knowledge that there is a vast
difference in trade value, and in fact original value of cars
of different year models; in this case there was about
$400.00 difference in '49 and '50 Packards and on the
witness stand :Murray was handed the National Automobile Dealers Association ( N. A. D. A.) book and refused
to read to the jury the values placed therein. Tr. 101-2)
And when asked to give the jury the values as shown by
the book, he said: ..1 won't." (Tr. 102).
iVIurray himself did not believe that he had concluded
a contract because the title to the 1941 Hudson was turned
in to Taylor and not Murray (Tr. 51) a'nd on November
11th Murray was sent by Taylor over to Stuart's to get
Stuart to sign the certificate of title on the Hudson. This,
Murray did even after being discharged ( Tr. 68). Murray
never offered or tendered to Stuart the '49 Packard (Tr.
123 - 170), and did not, himself want to go through with
the Stuart deal until he was settled with the Finance
Company, even though he had taken the Hudson to
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Taylor's. (Tr. 123). He treated the car as his at all times
and in fact he obtained another buyer for it and asked
permission of Taylor's auditor to keep it a few more days
( Tr. 177). And this was between the 11th of November
and 1st of December. He then did not claim he had made
any binding deal with Stuart.
Murray had informed Stuart that the '49 Packard had
been driven only 1600 miles and when Stuart examined it
at Taylors on the 9th of November, the reading was found
to be 2600 miles ( Tr. 157).
Murray did not accomplish a completed transaction.
The Hudson was not transferred by Stuart (Tr. 131), nor
was the Packard ever tendered, or in condition to be
tendered to Stuart because J\..furray turned it over to the
Finance Company voluntarily ( Tr. 123). Even though
the Packard was placed, after re-possession, in Taylor's
place it was tendered back to Murray by Taylor for
exactly the same sum as Taylor was required to pay the
Finance Company, namely $2100.00. This tender Murray
refused or failed to accept ( Tr. 186).
The cause of the loss of Murray's Packard to the Finance Company was not through any fault of Taylor's or
of Stuart's. He abused the employees of Taylor's (Tr.l79)
and came to the place of business in an intoxicated condition ( Tr. 191), and in addition to this he received sufficient money in salary and commission to have redeemed
the delinquent payment. He owned only an $80.00 or
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$90.00 installment ( Tr. 124), and when he was fired or
quit he was paid $122.83 by Taylor (Tr. 175) which was
only for one-third of the month of November.
~lurray

was paid and accepted the regular commission on the '50 Packard which was sold on the show-room
floor, and this was after his services were terminated, thus
indicating that he had not sold his own car, and felt that
he was entitled to the commission on the new car ( Tr.
106-7, 174-5-6 & 187).
Taylor did not impose himself on either Murray or
Stuart and told both of them to settle their differences
(Tr. 62,66 and 188), and in pursuance to such instruction
Murray took the title to the Hudson to Stuart, so Taylor
could close the deal on the '50 Hudson, and brought the
Hudson title back to Taylor (Tr. 110-1).
After Murray had received the commission on the '50
Packard from Taylor and after he had defaulted on the
contract with the Finance Company and turned in the '49
Packard to them, and after Taylor had paid the Finance
Company $2100.00, and after he had turned over the
Hudson to Taylor, and after Stuart had taken out the new
'50 Packard, Murray then changed his mind and finding
the Hudson standing in front of Taylor's with the keys in
it, he took possession of the Hudson, and drove it over to
his home in Wellsville without the knowledge or permission of Taylor.

(Tr. 54 & 92).
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After Murray had driven his car about 2600 miles and
had owned it about two months, he he charged Murray
for his second hand, 1949 Packard, within about $40.00
of the price which Stuart could have bought the same
type of 1950 Packard, brand new (Tr. 117-8).
Taylor and Stuart by their pleadings deny that any
contract was entered into between Stuart and Murray
(Tr. 17).
ARGUMENT
PoiNT

A

There was no such stipulation as set forth in appellant's brief, page 7 apd 8, for there the Court said: "So
we know where we're going, the Court understood it is
to make findings on all issues not submitted to the jury,
provided there's evidence to justify such findings" ( Tr.
200).
The question of delivery of title to the Hudson, of
the completed contract, and of general damages, and as
to many other matters were never submitted to the jury.
(See the Court's remarks Tr. 207-8).
Counsel for appellant insists in his brief ( p. 8) that
Stuart was doing business with Murray. T~is has conclusively been determined against appellant by the jury
(Tr. 31) and the Court in finding No. 7, (Tr. 37) and
amply supported by the evidence.
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Without ru·guing appellant's brief page by page, suffice it to sa:· that the only manner in which a comprehensive picture of the case can be had is to analyze the testimony as it reflects on the actions and conduct of Murray
in the Courtroom, and by the evidence.

We have here

an over-reaching and over-zealous salesman who misrepresented to a lifelong friend that he was selling a '50 packard.
(For a price that is within $40.00 of a new car of the same
type). The actual difference in value if both '49 and '50
had been new is about $400.00.

Murray justifies this

practice by stating that he felt he was paying too much
for the Hudson (Tr. 128) where he said that he gave
about $150.00 more than the Hudson was worth.
It is interesting to follow the testimony. of Murray

on cross examination where an attempt was made over
many pages of testimony in an effort to get him to tell the
jury what the ''blue book" (NADA) difference in value is
between a '49 and '50 Packard.

"Q. Tell the jury the difference in value in a '49
and 1950 car.
A.

That's a matter of who is selling it.

Q. You refuse to tell them that as quoted by the
books, do you?
A.

You tell them.

Q. Do you refuse?
A.

You tell them . . . . . .
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Q. You don't want to tell the jury?
A. No, I don't" (Tr. 115)
(And again at Tr. 101)

"Q. "I want you to tell the jury the difference in
value to an automobile dealer of a turned-in '50
car on a repurchase, and you've got it (the
NADA) right in your hand, and you can give it
to the jury as easily as not. Will you do it or
won't you?
A.

I won't."

He claimed that he had not gained a penny on the
whole deal, notwithstanding the fact that all of the transactions were handled through Taylor, and he was drawing a flat salary of $200 per month, plus three per cent
commission on sales (Tr. 105). He would not admit that
Taylor had paid him a commission on the 1950 Packard
even when he had been shown the check which he had
indorsed and on which was a computation showing three
percent of the wholesale price of the Packard, less freight
and taxes (Tr. 106-7).
Murray alleges in his pleadings and in his brief that
he was damaged by reason of the misconduct of Taylor
and Stuart, notwithstanding the fact that the cause of his
discharge was that he abused the auditor by calling him
a liar and otherwise causing a commotion in Taylor's place
of business and entering the place in a drunken condition
Tr. 179- 191). Not only that, but when he first came
back from Stuart's, he left the papers in the seat of an old
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Studebaker, and did not show up for work again for two
or three days ( Tr. 65). And in addition to this, all the
while he having drawn $200 per month plus commissions,
he defaulted on his contract with the Finance Company,
and this he also blan1es to Taylor and Stuart. It was for
this sort of conduct that the Court made it finding No. 9
as follows:
. . . "while all of the allegations of the answer and
cotmter-claim and third party complaint, were and
are untrue and incorrect. In this connection, this
court further finds that neither Charles P. Stuart nor
the plaintiff ever breached any contract with the
defendant Ken Murray, and that said Ken Murray
has not been damaged in any respect by the acts of
any of the other parties to this action, but that said
damages and injuries, if any, sustained by said Ken
~1urray, were brought about solely by his own mistakes and inability to meet his obligations."
The question of general damages was left strictly to
the ~ourt and this has been settled by conclusion No. 2,
"That the defendant is not entitled to judgment against
either the plaintiff or the third party defendant" ( Tr. 38).
Also, finding 8 is amply supported from the evidence
hereinbefore quoted:
"the court further finds that said Ken ~1urray never
did leave the title papers for his own Packard car
with anyone at the plaintiffs garage for delivery to
Stuart, nor did he ever offer personally to deliver to
said Stuart the title papers to his own Packard; the
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most that said Murray ever did in this respect was
to make it possible for Mr. Stuart to obtain the possesion of said Packard only, and that said Stuart,
believing that he was dealing with the plaintiff, and
never having been tendered the title to Murray's
Packard, was at liberty to change his mind in his
dealings with the plaintiff, the said Stuart believing
all along that he was dealing with the plaintiff
through Ken Murray as plaintiff's agent, and to select
another Packard automobile on the floor of the plaintiff's showroom, which he did do."
No part of the above finding had anything to do with
the question of fraud determined by the jury, and in fact
the jury made the same finding in answer to interrogatory
No. 3 ( Tr. 31). This, then concludes the entire case in
favor of plaintiff and Stuart.
Counsel complains (on page 15 of his brief) of my
objection. I ask the Court to consider that my reference
to the 1949 Packard is either a mistake of the reporter or
an inadvertance on my part. On page 67, I refer to the
same matter, and mention the 1950 Packard. All through
the pleadings and evidence we have claimed that Murray
represented his car as a '50 Packard. As an example of
this refer to the question the Court asked Murray: (Tr. 85)
"Mr. Murray, I'll ask you the nature of the conversation that you had with Mr. Stuart at the time you
made this trade in the field that you have just testified to. Or sale of the Packard car, as to a '49 or '50
model Paql<ard. A. I said to Mr. Stuart that this car
was a 1950 Packard."
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There was then some question which arose as to changing
the designation after registration with the State, and both
Taylor and the State Tax Commission representative said
that this cannot be done, and of course, such is the case.
The general argument here disposes of each point
catagorically argued by appellant, but it is important to
meet the challenge of counsel at the bottom of page 18.
This is not a matter of failure of consideration. Murray
claims he had the title to the Hudson, but there is not a
word in evidence to the effect that he could ever have
performed had there been a contract with Stuart. In fact
he voluntarily turned his Packard in as above stated, and
then said that he did not want to go through with the
Stuart deal until he had straightened out his affairs with
the Finance Company (Tr. 123 & 170). As further evidence of this I point to the fact that Murray asked Taylor

if he could keep the car for a few more days, because he
had a sale for it (Tr. 177-8) to another party.
The contention of counsel that certain findings of the
Court are not within any issue joined, and the contention
that the verdict of the jury is binding are without merit.
Appellant pleads that he is the owner of the Hudson. The
Respondents both generally deny this allegation (Tr. 3, 4,
6 & 8, 17 & 18). Furthermore, Respondents pleaded as
follows: (Tr. 7 & 8)
"That at the time the defendant was still employed
with the plaintiff and thereupon, as an agent of the
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plaintiff and in order to deliver the possession of said
automobile (Hudson) and the certificate of title
thereto from the said Charles Stewart to this plaintiff, but after he had terminated his employment with
the plaintiff, secured from the said Charles Stewart
the possession of said Hudson automobile and the
certificate of title thereto upon the representation
to the said Charles Stewart that he, the said defendant, would deliver the possession of the said automobile and certificate of title thereto to this plaintiff,
and that the said defendant did, as a fact, deliver the
possession thereof to the plaintiff at his place of
business in Logan, Utah, and deposited the unsigned
certificate of title with the plaintiff; that shortly after
such delivery the defendant secured from this plaintiff said certificate of title upon the representation
to this plaintiff that he would secure the signature
thereon ¢ the said Charles Stewart and deliver the
same back to this plaintiff, all of which representations the defendant did not intend to fulfill and, as
a matter of fact, has never delivered the possession
of such certificate to this plaintiff and still keeps and
holds the same against the will and consent of this
plaintiff. Further answering said paragraph, plaintiff alleges that defendant surreptitiously and secretly
and without the consent of this plaintiff took the
possession of the said Hudson automobile out of the
possession of this plaintiff wrongfully, illegally, and
without any right, title or ownership therein."
I do not claim to be a master of pleading, but I feel
certtain that the general denial of ownership of the Hudson in defendant, and the above copied matter from the
pleadings plainly puts in issue every finding of the Court.
And under Rule 49 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this
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issue not having been demanded by Counsel to be determined by the jury was properly before the Court.
Points B. C. and D.

All these points are related to the arguments under
A above, and while here controvertted, it is felt that it
would take useless time and space to repeat.
CoNCLUSION

The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
GEO. D. PRESTON
Attorney for Respondents.
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